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This year's review article addresses two of the most significant financial legislative de-
velopments in the United States and Europe in 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act and the Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Manag-
ers, respectively. It furthermore gives insights into specific, material developments in the
legislation of Italy and Brazil during 2010.
I. Developments in the United States*
A. THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
On July 21, 2010, the most sweeping banking legislation in a decade was signed into law
as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("the Act"). With a
stroke of a pen, all types of financial institutions became subject to significant new condi-
tions and limitations; nonfinancial, publicly traded companies received new obligations as
well. As is always the case with landmark legislation, the consequences on day-to-day
operations will emerge over time, as regulators begin their analysis and rulemaking.
The legislation is designed to advance several policies that had been observed, at best, in
theory rather than practice, and is in some ways a reaction to the popular belief that the
financial crisis of the last few years can be traced to regulatory failure. In broad terms,
each policy is embodied in one or more specific titles:
* Identification of institutions and activities that pose systemic risk to the U.S. econ-
omy and the proper management of these risks-hence the creation of the Financial
Services Oversight Council ("FSOC") (Title I).
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* The end of the "too-big-to-fail" doctrine and the creation of a mechanism to handle
the failure of systemically significant new institutions-thus new orderly liquidation
authority for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") (Title II) and
changes to the emergency powers of the Federal Reserve Board ("FRB") and the
FDIC (Tide XI).
* Regulation of the shadow financial services industry, with respect both to institu-
tions that take on or transfer risk-as a result, new regulation for private equity and
hedge funds (Tide IV) and participants in the structured finance market (Tide DQ.
* Transparency of complex financial instruments designed to transfer risk-accord-
ingly, the restructuring of the derivatives market (Title VII).
* Effective protection of home loan borrowers and other consumers against abusive
and deceptive practices-thus, the creation of the Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection ("BCFP") (Tide X) and enhanced regulation of the residential mortgage
industry (Tide X1V), and the inclusion of the Durbin Amendment which requires
interchange transaction fees on electronic debit transactions to be "reasonable and
proportional" to the incremental costs to the issuer with respect to the transaction.
* Effective protection of retail investors-as a result, enhanced regulation of broker
dealers and investment advisers (Title IX).
* Appropriate safety and soundness regulation of all institutions that control insured
depository institutions-hence new substantive regulation (Title VI) and changes in
supervisory authority (Title III).
* Other concerns-several other titles address financial institutions or activities whose
links to the financial crisis are less clear, but that may pose great risks in the future:
insurance companies (Title V) and payment, clearing, and settlement services (Title
VIII).
The new rules and regulations, even though they may be a long time in coming in final
form, require immediate attention by financial institutions for two reasons:
First, the impact of any new requirements will be dramatic and in many cases will result
in material changes to how capital should be allocated across all business lines and how
each business line should be managed.
Second, economic events could force action before the nominal deadlines in the Act.
The economy remains fragile, and credit risk at the retail level is still significant. If there
are adverse future developments, these will not wait for the Act to take full effect, and
substantive regulation along the lines of the legislation could come into play sooner than
expected. In some ways, the federal regulators already possess the power to implement
the new obligations and duties contemplated by the Act.
As part of compliance planning, there are three overlapping perspectives to keep in
mind:
Regulatory Structure. The Act creates, among other things, two important agen-
cies-the FSOC and the BCFP. Both are likely to make decisions that will affect
institutions even outside of what is commonly perceived to be their jurisdiction.
Additionally, the FRB will gain sweeping new supervisory authority. The powers of
the other major federal financial services industry, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the FDIC and the Of-
fice of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) will expand in significant ways as
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well. The one nominal regulatory reduction is the abolition of the Office of Thrift
Supervision, although its powers and responsibilities will be folded into the OCC.
* Institutions. All but the smallest depository institutions will see changes in regula-
tion that will depend in significant part on structure and charter. Substantial super-
visory changes are in store for bank holding companies with nonbank subsidiaries;
the FRB now has far greater authority over these subsidiaries. Of course, large non-
bank financial companies should plan for the new relationship with the FSOC.
With respect to charters, federal savings associations may need to re-think their
charter choice (although the charter is not abolished), and companies with nonbank
banks could (but are not certain to) face new regulation.
* Operations and Activities. The Act creates significant new restrictions for nearly all
activities of financial institutions, both internal and external, and both wholesale and
retail. While the vast majority of financial institutions will not themselves be
deemed systemically significant, they may well engage in activities that the FSOC
believes present systemic risk. Greatly enhanced regulation by the FRB could be
the result. There are potentially critical changes for specific businesses as well. For
example, all participants at any stage of the residential mortgage business will have
new duties. The terms of certain mortgage loans are certain to change, which will
have a ripple effect throughout the mortgage industry. As another example, the
legislation, as is widely known and appreciated, effectively forces the reorganization
of the market for over-the-counter derivatives; less publicized are new limits on the
use of derivatives within a banking organization.
Until the regulations for each title are drafted and implemented, which is expected
during the course of 2011, some uncertainty will remain as to the extent of changes to
product offerings, processes, disclosures, and risk management practices. The history of
banking law in the United States is dynamic and has been so since the country's inception.
The Act is yet another sweeping revision that attempts to ensure the safety of the eco-
nomic lifeblood of America.
H1. Developments in the European Union (E.U.)*
A. EUROPEAN DIRECTIVE ON ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUND MANAGERS
1. Introduction
On November 11, 2010,1 the European Parliament adopted the Directive on Alterna-
tive Investment Fund Managers ("AIFM"s), setting forth rules regulating the activities of
AIFMs.2 This Directive is certain to have a serious impact on the way E.U. funds are
* Contributed by Lennaert Posch and Michiel Coenraads of Stibbe (Amsterdam, the Netherlands),
following up on and updating their article in the International Financial Products and Services Committee
newsletter of August 2009.
1. Press Release, European Commission Statement at the occasion of the European Parliament vote on
the directive on hedge funds and private equity (Nov. 11, 2010), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press
ReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/l0/573&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
2. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Alternative
Investment Fund Managers and Amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC, COM (2009) 207 final
(Oct. 27, 2010) [hereinafter Directive of the European Parliament and of the CouncilJ, available at http://www.
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managed, and on the management and marketing of non-E.U. funds in the E.U. Conse-
quently, prior to its adoption, the Directive has, from the first draft of April 2009, encoun-
tered severe concerns from various interest groups.
According to the European Commission, which initially proposed the Directive, the
global financial crisis has exposed a series of vulnerabilities in the global financial system
and revealed that AIFMs, as significant actors in the financial system, can cause significant
risks. These risks exist not only for investors in AIFM-managed funds, but also for inves-
tors' creditors, for the companies that form part of the funds' investment portfolios, and
even for the financial system at large.
The Directive regulates the managers of alternative investment funds (hereinafter also
"AIF"s), rather than directly managing the funds themselves. Under the Directive, a com-
prehensive, harmonized E.U. framework for prudential oversight and the supervision of
AIFMs is created. In addition, the new European Securities Market Authority ("ESMA")
will be granted certain powers to intervene in the management of AIFs. On the other
hand, granting AIFMs passport rights, thereby enabling them to provide their services and
market the funds across the internal market of the E.U., creates a level playing field.
2. Scope: Not Only European, But Global Impact
The Directive applies to all AIFMs located in the E.U. and to AIFMs located outside
the E.U. that manage E.U. AIFs or that market AIFs into the E.U. Generally, the follow-
ing exemptions apply: AIFMs that manage funds with an aggregate asset portfolio of less
than C100 million are exempted from the authorization requirement. AIFMs with assets
under management of less than C500 million are exempted as well, but only if those AIFs
are not leveraged (there can exist leverage at the portfolio company level though) and if
they do not offer redemption rights for the investors during five years after the inception
of the fund. To these smaller managers, a lighter "registration only"-regime applies.
They are however given the opportunity to 'opt-in' so as to avail themselves of passport-
ing rights, in which case these smaller funds must also fully comply with the Directive.
Certain specific entities, such as holding companies, central banks, pension funds in-
vesting their own money or securitization special purpose entities, do not fall within the
scope of the Directive.
It is remarkable that the scope is so broad that the Directive catches not only hedge
funds and private equity firms, but also other types of collective investment vehicles, such
as commodity funds or closed end listed investment companies. On the other hand, vehi-
cles that are not structured as a fund (but for example as managed accounts, such as Ber-
nard Madoff's investment company) are not covered by the Directive.3
3. Authorization
a. Authorization Process
A starting point of the Directive is that each member state of the E.U. must ensure that
no AIFM acts as a manager or promotes any fund without prior authorization in accor-
evca.eu/uploadedFiles/Home/Public.AndRegulatoryAffairs/AIFMDirective/AIFMDProposalText.27
1010.pdf.
3. Id. arts. 2 1-2, 3 1 1.
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dance with the Directive.4 The procedure for obtaining authorization includes providing
a wide range of information to the member state's authority, including (i) details on the
shareholders/members of the AIFM and its structure; (ii) details on its remuneration poli-
cies; (iii) the terms (or rules) and the instruments of incorporation of each fund that the
AIFM intends to manage; as well as (iv) the information that the AIFM is required to give
to the fund's prospective investors.5 The authority must decide within three months (ex-
tendable on a case-by-case basis to six months) after the application has been submitted
and can approve, approve with restrictions, or reject the application. ESMA will maintain
a central public register of all AIFMs and all AIFs that may be marketed in the E.U.
b. Initial Capital and Own Funds
There is a minimum own funds requirement for AIFMs of C125,000 (C300,000 for self-
managed funds), but additional capital (subject to a cap) will be required if the assets of the
fund under management exceed C250 million. This aims to ensure the continuity and
regularity of the AIFMs' work.
AIFMs must also have adequate funds to cover professional liability risks or have ade-
quate insurance for these risks.6
4. Requirements
As set out above, the Directive does not aim to regulate the funds themselves, but
merely the AIFMs managing the funds. Also, it does not regulate the investment strate-
gies that the AIFMs use. The requirements provided by the Directive concern the con-
duct of business, the organization of the AIFM, and the remuneration of its staff. In
addition, the Directive aims to increase transparency by imposing wide-reaching disclo-
sure and reporting requirements.
a. Conduct of Business
(1) General
The Directive provides both general principles and specific rules for the way AIFMs
must conduct their business. In terms of general principles, the AIFMs must, inter alia:
(i) act honestly, with due skill, care and diligence and fairly;
(ii) act in the best interest of their AIF, their investors, and the integrity of the market
as a whole;
(iii) ensure that all their investors are treated fairly; and
(iv) prevent any conflicts of interest.]
(2) Remuneration
The Directive contains detailed remuneration rules (also encompassing carried interest)
that are in large part based on the Financial Stability Board and G20 standards. The
Directive will require AIFMs to (i) implement remuneration policies and practices that
promote sound and effective risk management and do not encourage undue risk-taking;
4. Id. arts. 6 1 1, 7 1.
5. Id. art. 7.
6. Id. art. 9.
7. Id. art. 12 [ 1.
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and (ii) apply detailed rules in respect of the ways they compensate their (senior) employ-
ees (e.g., deferment of bonus payments).8
(3) Risk management
The Directive makes a clear distinction between (i) risk management and (ii) portfolio
management, and determines that those functions must be separately operated (and thus
be subject to separate reviews). The risk management systems must measure, manage, and
monitor all risks associated with each investment strategy and each fund. Also, each time
the fund makes an investment, it must follow a (written and regularly updated) due dili-
gence process. It must provide insight in the risks and impact thereof on each fund's
portfolio, and ensure that the risk profile corresponds to the fund's applicable terms. Also,
risk management systems must enable the funds to be stress-tested. For each AIF, a maxi-
mum level of leverage shall be set by the AIFM, as well as the extent of the potential (re-
use) of collateral or guarantee to be granted in respect thereof.9
(4) Liquidity management
Pursuant to the Directive, the AIFM must have an adequate liquidity management sys-
tem in order to ensure that the liquidity profile of the portfolio corresponds with the
underlying obligations. The investment strategy, the liquidity profile, and the redemption
policy must be consistent. Also, in this respect the AIFM must regularly conduct stress
tests. 10 These rules must prevent the problems we have seen during the recent financial
crisis where large-scale redemption requests were made. Funds were not able to meet
these requests, and thus, had to disinvest, which may have had an impact on the financial
system at large.
(5) Investments in securitized loans
The European Commission is required to adopt specific measures setting out require-
ments for the originator, sponsor, and the original lender in order for an AIFM to be
allowed to invest in securities of this type on behalf of an AIF.11
b. Organizational
(1) General
The Directive provides both general principles and specific rules for the way AIFMs are
organized. 12 In terms of general principles, the AIFMs must have:
(i) adequate and appropriate resources that are necessary for the proper performance
of its management activities; and
(ii) updated systems, documented internal procedures, and regular internal controls of
the conduct of its business in order to mitigate and manage risks.
The European Commission believes that the risks (both for investors and for the finan-
cial system at large) associated with funds stem from not only the AIFM, but also from the
other key actors in the fund structure: the valuer and the depositary. Consequently, the
Directive focuses on these entities as well.
8. Id. art. 13 1 1, Annex II.
9. Id. art. 15.
10. Id. art. 16.
11. Id. art. 17.
12. Id. arts. 18, 19, 20 1 1.
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(2) Valuation
The net asset value per share or unit of an AIF must be valued once a year. For open-
ended funds, additional calculations need to be made at appropriate times, given a fund's
issuance and redemption frequency. For closed-ended funds, additional calculations must
be made whenever there is an increase or decrease in capital. Such valuation must be
performed by the AIFM itself (in a way that is functionally independent from portfolio
management and the setting of remuneration policy) or by an external valuer (subject to
professional registration or similar credentials and able to furnish professional guarantees).
The rules regarding delegation (see below) also apply to a valuation by an external
valuer.13
(3) Delegation
AIFMs that intend to delegate part of their functions to other parties need to notify the
authority before effecting such an arrangement and comply with certain conditions, such
as, inter alia: (i) being able to provide a justification for the delegation; (ii) the delegatee
having sufficient resources and staff as well as a good repute and sufficient experience; (iii)
the delegatee being authorized or registered and supervised as a manager (if the delegation
concerns management functions); (iv) the AIFM being able to monitor the delegation,
give instructions to the delegatee, and cancel the delegation with immediate effect, if in
the interest of the AIF's investors; (v) the delegation not preventing the AIFM from acting
in the best interests of investors; and (vi) the delegation not preventing oversight by the
AIFM's regulators.14 Delegation of management functions may not be made to an AIF's
depositary or other entity whose interests may conflict with the AIFM or the investors of
the AIF (unless measures have been taken to adequately address such conflict of interest).
Delegation of portfolio-or risk-management functions to a non-E.U. country can only be
permitted if co-operation between the AIFM's regulator and the regulator of the non-
E.U. country is ensured. Furthermore, the AIFM's liability to a fund and its investors is
not affected by any delegation. In other words, the AIFM is responsible for acts and
omissions of the delegatee.
(4) Depositaries
The Directive also aims to ensure that the party that actually takes custody of the
money and assets of an AIF (except for non-E.U. AIFs that are not marketed in the E.U.)
is under E.U. regulation as well. Under the Directive, (i) an independent E.U. credit
institution (bank); (ii) another E.U. regulated entity authorized to provide custodial ser-
vices and meeting certain capital requirements; or (iii) an entity that is regulated and au-
thorized to act as depositary under the UCITS (Undertakings for Collective Investment
in Transferable Securities) Directive, must be engaged as depositary of the funds' assets.
For non-E.U. AIFs, the depositary may be a bank or other custodian located outside the
E.U., provided it is regulated in a way that is equivalent to E.U. law and that is effectively
enforced.1s
The Directive provides for further rules concerning the location of the depositary and
the functions it is required to perform, as well as the depositary's liability vis-a-vis the AIF
and its investors, which in most cases, is near strict. This means that the depositary is
13. Id. art. 19 11 3-5.
14. Id. art. 20 11 1-3.
15. Id. art. 21.
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liable for (i) a loss of assets under its custody, unless it can prove that the loss was caused
by "an external event beyond its reasonable control, the consequences of which would
have been unavoidable despite all reasonable efforts to the contrary;"16 and (ii) losses suf-
fered by the AIF or its investors caused by its negligence or intentional failure to comply
with the Directive.
Delegation of the custody functions by a depository is only possible in observance of
strict rules.
5. Disclosures and Reporting
The Directive contains rules regarding the AIFMs' transparency to investors, regula-
tors, and others. The AIFM must produce an annual report for each fund that it manages
and make that available to the investors and the regulators. Also, the AIFM must submit
certain specified information to the regulators (regarding liquidity, leverage, and the prin-
cipal exposures and concentrations of the fund) and to prospective investors before they
invest. Furthermore, there are ongoing disclosure requirements to investors regarding
leverage (on a regular basis), on liquidity and risk management (periodically), and with
respect to material changes to any information previously provided.17
The Directive provides further rules for the required disclosures by specific funds: (i)
funds using leverage on a substantial basis and (ii) funds that acquire major stakes in
companies.
a. Leverage
AIFMs that manage funds that are leveraged (on a substantial basis) must make certain
additional disclosures to regulators.18 The Directive itself does not impose any flat limits
on leverage, though. But, the AIFM is required to set the limits for each fund it manages,
demonstrate compliance with those limits, and demonstrate that they are reasonable.
The E.U. member states will have the power (but not the obligation) to set further
limits in exceptional cases, in order to ensure the stability of the financial system.
Note that only leverage at the fund level, and not at the portfolio level, is taken into
account.
b. Significant Stakes
The Directive imposes a notification obligation to the regulator whenever the voting
rights held by an AIF reach, exceed, or fall below the thresholds of ten percent, twenty
percent, thirty percent, fifty percent, and seventy-five percent of a company, listed or
unlisted.19 If an AIFM acquires a controlling interest in a listed company or a large un-
listed company (which in the latter case means that it becomes able to exercise fifty per-
cent or more of the voting rights), specific requirements apply. The AIFM must in such a
case inform the company and the other shareholders of the company of (i) the fund's
identity; (ii) the fund's development plan for the company; (iii) the fund's policy to deal
with conflicts between the fund and the company, and (iv) the fund's communication pol-
16. Id. art. 21 11 5, 11, 13, 15.
17. Id. arts. 22 1 1-2, 23 1-2.
18. Id. art. 25 1 1-3.
19. Id. arts. 26 $ 5, 27 9 1.
VOL. 45, NO. 1
FINANCIAL PRODUCTS & SERVICES 231
icy.20 If the investment concerns an unlisted company, the AIFM must provide additional
information, such as its intentions as to the future business of the company, including
consequences for employees, and in its annual report for the relevant AIF, the company's
likely future development.21
6. Asset Stripping
At the insistence of certain members of the E.U. Parliament, the final text of the Direc-
tive contains provisions to prevent "asset stripping" where an AIF (individually or jointly)
acquires control of a company. The provisions apply for a period of two years following
such acquisition. The AIFM of the relevant AIF is, during this period, not allowed to
facilitate or support (by vote or otherwise) certain distributions, capital reductions, and
share redemptions where this would lead to a greater distribution than is justified by the
company's profits or where the effect would reduce net assets below subscribed capital and
reserves that may not be distributed.22
7. Passport Rights and Third Country ssues
An authorized E.U. AIFM may manage and market (units in) an E.U. AIF to profes-
sional investors within its home state. The passport right, to be in place from January
2013, entails that an authorized AIFM may market the E.U. funds it manages to profes-
sional investors in each E.U. member state. 23 The only requirement to market in an E.U.
member state other than the AIFM's home state is that it must first notify its home state
regulator, who must forward the information to the host state regulator. The Directive
also provides a passport right to provide management services throughout the E.U., either
on a cross border basis or via the establishment of a branch. Again, the AIFM must notify
the home state regulator of its pan-European aspirations.
The most controversial aspect of the Directive was the treatment of third country (non-
E.U.) managers and funds. In the end, it now seems likely that the issue has been resolved
in favor of granting non-E.U. funds a form of passport. But, this will be delayed until
2015.24 In the final text of the Directive, different marketing rules are provided for (i)
E.U. AIFMs managing non-E.U. AlFs; (ii) non-E.U. AIFMs managing E.U. AIFs; and
(iii) non-E.U. AIFMs managing non-E.U. AIFs. With respect to (i), E.U. AIFMs are
allowed to manage non-E.U. AIFs but for certain provisions relating to depositaries and
the annual report must fully comply with the Directive. Furthermore, additional require-
ments apply, such as the existence of adequate cooperation agreements between the regu-
lator of the AIFM's home state and the regulator of the country where the AIF is
established.25
As to marketing, as stated above, until 2015 there will not be a passport, but E.U.
AIFMs are allowed to market non-E.U. AIFs to professional investors under individual
member states' private placement regimes, provided (1) that the AIFM complies with the
20. Id. art. 28 1 1.
21. Id. art. 29 1 1-2.
22. Id. art. 30 1 1.
23. Id. arts. 32 1-3, 33 IT 1-2, 4.
24. Id. art. 63 bis 1 1.
25. Id. art. 34.
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Directive and (2) that the jurisdiction where the non-E.U. AIF is established is not deter-
mined to be a Non-Cooperative Country and Territory by the Financial Action Task
Force on anti-money laundering and terrorist financing (an "NCC").26 It is likely that, in
the course of 2015, a marketing passport for non-E.U. AIFs will become available pro-
vided that the above requirements are met and there is also a tax sharing information
agreement in place between the state where the relevant AIF is established and the home
member state of the AIFM as well as the other member states into which marketing is to
take place.27
Non-E.U. AIFMs that intend to manage E.U. AIFs need an authorization from the
member state in which the AIF is established (the "member state of reference").28 This
can be done cross-border or by the establishment of a branch office in the member state of
reference (a minimal presence needs to be established).
Duly authorized non-E.U. AIFMs can market E.U. AIFs under the future passport re-
gime provided they comply with the Directive and that notification is made to the regula-
tor of each member state in which it intends to market.29
A duly authorized non-E.U. AIFM will, from 2015 on, be allowed to market units in a
non-E.U. AIF to professional investors under the passport regime subject to, inter alia, the
following requirements: (a) compliance with the Directive; (b) notifications to the regula-
tors of member states into which it will market; (c) the existence of cooperation agree-
ments between the regulators; and (d) the jurisdiction of the AIF is not an NCC.30
Non-E.U. AIFMs will be allowed (until 2018) to market units in an E.U. or non-E.U.
AIF under the national private placement regime of individual member states. They must,
however, in that case also comply with a number of additional requirements which,
broadly, are the following: (a) compliance with provisions of the Directive regarding the
annual report; disclosure and reporting; (b) if applicable, compliance with the provisions
on the disclosure of control and asset stripping; (c) compliance with appropriate coopera-
tion agreements between the relevant regulators; and (d) demonstration that the jurisdic-
tion of establishment of the non-AIF is not an NCC.31
8. Retail Investors
Member states may also permit the marketing of units in a fund to retail investors, if
they so wish. In such a case they may also impose stricter requirements on the AIFM or
the AIF in question than are set forth in the Directive in respect of the marketing to
professional investors.32
9. ESMA
ESMA may, under certain conditions and in certain circumstances, require that the
regulator of a member state take any of the following actions: (i) a prohibition on market-
26. Id. art. 36 1.
27. Id. art. 35 2(c).
28. Id. art. 37 1.
29. Id. art. 38 91 1-2.
30. Id. art. 39.
31. Id. art. 40 1 1.
32. Id. art. 41.
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ing shares or units in E.U. AIFs that are managed by non-E.U. AIFMs or in non-E.U.
AIFs that are managed by E.U. AIFMs; (ii) impose restrictions on non-E.U. AIFMs in
respect to the management of an AIF where excessive risk is concentrated in a specific
market on a cross border basis; and (iii) impose restrictions on non-E.U. AIFMs relating
to the management of an AIF where their activities pose an important counterparty risk to
a credit institution or other systemically important institutions.33
10. Concerns In The Market
Many lobbyists and interest groups have, during the legislative process, expressed their
views on the Directive. For obvious reasons, many of them welcome the passport rights
granted to AIFMs to market funds and provide services across the internal market of the
E.U., but oppose the other side of the medal. Generally, the interest groups believe that
the new rules impose significant administrative burdens and costs while they do not create
significant additional value for investors.
The Alternative Investment Management Association ("AIMA") has argued that hedge
funds have neither caused nor played a significant role in the financial crisis and that hence
it is unfair to confront them with more rules and supervision.34 Although they have over
time, as the draft text developed, significantly softened their stance towards the Directive,
they remain concerned about the compliance burden and regret the potential abolition of
private placement regimes which, in their view, worked well.35
Many investors also point out that the costs of compliance will, in the end of the day,
have to be borne by the investors.36
11. Further Steps
The final text is yet to be adopted by the Council. Following translation into all official
E.U. languages, the Directive will be published in the Official Journal. The Directive will
come into force in early 2011 and must be implemented by member states in the begin-
ning of 2013. From that time on, there will be a passport for E.U. AIFMs marketing E.U.
AIFs. For non-E.U. AIFMs and managers of non-E.U. AIFs, the national private place-
ment regime will (continue to) apply. As from the beginning of 2015, it is likely that the
passporting regime will become available in parallel with the national private placement
regimes. From 2018, the private placement regimes may be abolished, leaving the pass-
port regime in place.
On practically every subject that the Directive addresses, the European Commission
must produce additional "level 2" rules. The Directive is very detailed in some respects
but is also still unclear in many others. Hopefully, "level 2" will provide more certainty as
to its practical, everyday impact.
33. Id. art. 45, 1 4(a)-(c).
34. See Florence Lombardo, A1MA Statement on European Commission Directive, AIMA, Apr. 23, 2009, http:/
/www.aima.org/en/announcements/aima-statement-on-european-comnission-directive.cfm.
35. See Andrew Baker, ALMA Statement on AIFMD, AIMA, Oct. 19, 2010, http://www.aima.org/en/an-
nouncements/aima-statement-on-aifmd.cfm.
36. See, e.g., Letter from Johcarlo R. Mark, Institutional Ltd. Partners Ass'n Chairman, to Jean Paul
Gauzbs, Rapporteur for the AIFM Directive (Mar. 8, 2010), available athttp://www.ft.com/cms/ed7cl252-2b
98-1 1df-a5c7-00144feabdcO.pdf.
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12. Conclusion
On the one hand, the Directive will increase the level playing field for AIFMs across the
internal market of the E.U., whereas on the other hand supervision (on both micro- and
macro-prudential levels) will be materially increased. This will also increase the adminis-
trative burden, both for the AIFMs as for the regulators. The exclusion of offshore funds
of the passport rights, at least for the first two years after the Directive coming into effect,
gives somewhat of a head start to their European competitors.
III. Developments in Italy*
A. INVESTMENT FUNDS
On May 31, 2010, the Government of Italy issued Law Decree no. 78 on "Urgent
action on financial stabilization and economic competitiveness,"37 converted to Law no.
122 of July 30, 2010.38 Article 32 of such Law Decree,39 while providing for the reorgani-
zation of the tax rules of real estate close-end funds (the immediate intention of this provi-
sion is to stem the use and setting up of real estate close-end funds only to take advantage
of certain tax benefits40 applicable to those funds), introduces key amendments to the
regulation of all types of investment funds in order to protect the investors, enhance the
flexibility of the investment funds, and render them more competitive in the international
arena.
Technically, such objectives have been achieved, inter alia, through the following
amendments to the Italian Consolidated Law on Financial Intermediation ("TUF").41
First, the definition of "investment funds" has been amended and clarified by specifying
the economic function and the features of the funds. According to the new provision, 42
investment funds mean equity raised independently through the issue of one or more fund
units among a number of investors, with the aim of investing the equity raised in accor-
dance with a pre-established investment policy; divided into units pertaining to a given
number of investors; managed upstream in the interests of the investors and fully indepen-
dent of those investors.
Second, to enhance the protection of the unit holders and attract more domestic and
foreign investments, it has further specified the separation of the assets/obligations of a
certain fund vis-i-vis the assets/obligations of other funds managed by the same invest-
ment company. In this regard, article 36, subsection 6 of TUF has been amended by
* Developments in Italy was contributed by Mattia Colonnelli de Gasperis and Francesca Canzani of
Colonnelli de Gasperis Studio Legale in Milan, Italy (info@colonnellilaw.com), which provides legal advice
on financial products and services in Italy.
37. Decreto Legge 31 maggio 2010, n. 78, in G.U. 30 luglio 2010, n. 176 (It.), available at http://www.alta
lex.com/index.php?idnot= 11219.
38. Legge 30 luglio 2010, n. 122, in G.U. 30 luglio 2010, n. 176 (It.), available at http://www.urp.it/allegati/
Legge_2010_122.pdf.
39. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Alternative
Investment Fund Managers and Amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC, supra note 2, art. 32.
40. See Decreto Legge 25 settembre 2001, n. 351, converted to Legge 23 novembre 2001, n. 410, in G.U.
24 novembre 2001, n. 274 (It.), available at http://www.parlamento.it/parlam/leggi/014101.htn.
41. Decreto Legislativo 24 febbraio 1998, n. 58, in G.U. 26 martzo 1998, n. 71 (It.).
42. Id. art. I § 1(j).
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stating the fund is liable exclusively with its own assets in relation to the obligations un-
dertaken for the fund's own account. Due to certain technicalities, that modification,
among other things, increases the leverage that can be used by each fund.
Third, new article 37, subsection 2(b) of TUF sensibly limits the regulatory supervision
of the Bank of Italy on the so called "reserved funds," which are funds reserved only to
"qualified investors" (mostly, institutional investors). In particular, the rules of these
funds are no longer subject to the prior approval of the Bank of Italy, neither same rules (i)
are subject to certain drafting criteria and (ii) have to contain a certain minimum content
(drafting criteria and minimum content which still apply to the "ordinary funds" (i.e. not
reserved funds)). Such radical deregulation enhances flexibility and promotes efficiency of
the system by reducing compliance costs and fees to be paid to the fund manager. That
simplification aligns Italy with the applicable laws and regulations of other countries. At
the same time, the elimination of the prior approval of the fund rules by the Bank of Italy
increases the responsibility of the industry players.
Given the high degree of technicality of the subject matter, the Italian Ministry of
Economy and Finance is in charge of issuing a decree implementing in details the de-
scribed amendments.43 This decree has not yet been enacted, but a draft of the decree has
already been prepared and likely will be circulated for public consultation. Judging from
the draft of the decree, there are many things to come, and not all related solely to the
implementation of the mentioned amendments.44 For instance, new rules will probably
be introduced (i) to draw a clearer line between "harmonized funds" and "alternative
funds," as defined by the E.U. regulations and directives; (ii) to extend the maximum term
of close-end funds up to fifty years; (iii) to enlarge the eligible assets of the real estate
funds; and (iv) to extend the period of initial contributions of close-end funds up to
twenty-four months.
IV. Developments in Brazil
A. THE USE OF THE IOF TAX TO REGULATE THE INFLOW OF FOREIGN CURRENCY
iN BRAziL*
The tax on credit and exchange transactions, insurance and securities (Imposto sobre
Operafies de Cridito, Cambio e Seguro, ou relativas a Titulos ou Valores Mobilidrios-IOF) in
Brazil is assessed on the amount of bank loans and similar transactions, on the amount of
foreign currency purchased or sold, and on insurance premiums and the price of securities
purchased or sold. The applicable tax rate may vary from zero to twenty-five percent and
depends on the kind of operation. The IOF is a regulatory tax and the rates are decreased
or increased by the Brazilian government whenever the authorities decide to foster or
reduce the inflow of foreign currency funds into the country.
43. L. n. 122/2010 (It.).
44. Per I Fondi Immobiliari "Alternativi" Non Sara Pi4 Necessario L'ok di Bankitalia [Bank of Italy approval no
longer required for "alternative" real estate funds], IL SOLE 24 ORE, Nov. 11, 2010, http://www.ilsole24ore.
com/art/norme-e-tributi/2010-1l-10/fondi-immobiliari-altemativi-sara-222524.shtml?uid=AYUqDiiC.
* By Walter Stuber and Adriana Maria Gddel Stuber, of Walter Stuber Consultoria Juridica (Sio Paulo,
Brazil).
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Interest rates in Brazil are higher than those prevailing in the international market, and
this difference represents an opportunity for making additional gains and thereby at-
tracting foreign investors. Therefore, the IOF rate affects the effective cost and reduces
the profitability of the transaction.
Like many other countries, Brazil decided to take a series of measures aimed to reduce
the entry of foreign currency funds for short-term investments, which is considered specu-
lative capital, not desired by the Brazilian government. The Brazilian Finance Minister,
Guido Mantega, claimed that "international currency war" had broken out and argued
that the increase of the IOF rate was an important measure to defend the value of the
Brazilian currency (Real) in this war.
In October 2010, the Brazilian government twice increased the IOF rate levied on ex-
change transactions related to the inflow of funds for foreign capital investments in the
Brazilian market, comprising investments in fixed income instruments, such as debentures
and other private debt instruments (titulos de divida privada), and investment funds, includ-
ing multimarket funds (fundos multimercado), stock funds (fundos de ac6es), and private eq-
uity funds (fundos de investimento em participaf5es-FLPs). Prior to October 5, 2010, the
liquidation of such exchange transactions was subject to the IOF at the rate of two per-
cent, in accordance with Decree No. 6.306 of December 14, 2007.45
The first increase was made by means of Decree No. 7.323 of October 4, 2010, which
came into force on the following day, when it was published in the Official Gazette of the
Union (Didrio Oficial da Unido-DOU).46 As a result, as of October 5, 2010, the transaction
rate has been increased from two percent to four percent.
Very shortly thereafter, this increase was deemed to be insufficient and, as of October
19, 2010, by means of Decree No. 7.330 of October 18, 2010,47 the applicable rate was
increased again from four percent to six percent. At the same time, the IOF rate on
exchange transactions for foreign capital investments related to the constitution of mar-
gins of guarantee (either initial or additional) required by the stock, commodities and
futures exchanges was increased from 0.38% to 6%.
The IOF rate on foreign capital investments in the Brazilian capital market, comprising
variable income instruments, such as securities traded on the stock exchange or assets
traded on the commodities and futures exchange, in the form regulated by the Brazilian
Monetary Council (Conselho Monetdrio Nacional-CMN), remains unchanged and continues
to be two percent. Transactions with derivatives which result in predetermined income
are considered fixed income and are taxed at the rate of six percent.
Currently, there is no IOF on exchange transactions related to the outflow of funds
(remittances abroad) related to foreign capital investments in the Brazilian financial and
capital markets, because the applicable rate is zero.
45. Decreto No. 6.306, de 14 de Dezembro de 2007, Didrio Oficial da Uniio [D.O.U.] de 17.12.2007.
(Braz.), available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Ato2007-2010/2007/Decreto/D6306.htm, (article
15 was amended by Derecto No. 7.323 and repealed by Decreto No. 7.330.).
46. Decreto No. 7.323, de 4 de Outubro de 2010, Didrio Oficial da Unifo [D.O.U.] de 5.10.2010, (Braz.),
available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Ato2007-2010/2010/Decreto/D73.23.htm.
47. Decreto No. 7.330, de 18 de Outubro de 2010, Didrio Oficial da Uniao (D.O.U.] de 19.10.2010,
(Bra,), available at http://www.planalto.govbr/ccivil_03/-Ato2007-2010/2010/Decreto/D7330.htm.
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To eliminate "creative solutions" aimed to avoid the six percent IOF rate and close
loopholes, the CMN Resolution No. 3.914 of October 20, 2010,48 expressly prohibited
financial institutions and other entities authorized to operate by the Central Bank of Brazil
(Banco Central do Brasil-Bacen) to lease, exchange, or lend instruments, securities, or other
financial assets to non-resident investors with the purpose to enable those investors to
perform transactions in the derivatives market without paying the IOF. As an exception,
transactions contracted before October 21, 2010 (date of publication of CMN Resolution
3,914 in the DOU), may be maintained up to their maturity date. Up to December 31,
2010, undetermined term transactions will not be subject to IOF, but such transactions
cannot be postponed nor renewed.
Furthermore, for the same reasons, CMN Resolution No. 3,915, also of October 20,
2010,49 established that any domestic migration of funds in Brazilian currency (Real) made
by non-resident investors destined to the constitution of margins of guarantee required by
the stock, commodities or future exchanges, are subject to simultaneous exchange transac-
tions, pursuant to the provisions of CMN Resolution No. 3.912 of October 7, 2010,50 and
consequently, are subject to the six percent IOF rate.
On October 6, 2010, in an extraordinary meeting, the Board of Bacen doubled the term
of exchange transactions for future liquidation that the Secretariat of the National Trea-
sury has to purchase foreign currency (United States Dollars) in the market in order to
pay the External Federal Public Debt, increasing the number of days from 750 days (two
years) to 1,500 days (four years). These purchases comprise interbank, arbitrage and fi-
nancial transactions and the matter is regulated by Bacen Circular No. 3.507 of October 6,
2010.51 This is another measure to control the depreciation of the United States Dollar.
The Brazilian government is determined to avoid the overvaluation of the Real and
eventually might have some success in achieving this purpose, depending on the effective
result of the aggregate measures taken so far. According to the analysts, however, it is
very likely that the Brazilian currency, in the same line of the vast majority of currencies of
other emerging countries, continues to be affected by the global movement of the weak-
ening of the United States Dollar. The most promising flows for 2011, in the case of
Brazil, are those of direct foreign investments and foreign capital investments in securities
traded on the stock exchange, which will not be affected by such measures. The attempt
to contain the overvaluation of the national currency is not limited to Brazil, and follows
several other intervening measures announced by many countries during the last weeks,
such as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, which tried to deal with the constant depreciation of
the United States Dollar vis-i-vis their national currencies.
48. Resoluio CMN No. 3.914, de 20 de Outubro de 2010, Diirio Oficial da Unilo [D.O.U.] de 21.10.10
(Braz.), available at https://www3.bcb.gov.br/normativo/detalharNormativo.do?method=detalharNormativo
&N=110089731.
49. Resoluqio CMN No. 3.915, de 20 de outubro de 2010, art. 1 § 1, D.O.U. de 21.10.10 (Braz.), available
at https://www3.bcb.gov.br/normativo/detalharNormativo.do?method=detalharNormativo&N=1 10089732.
50. Resolugio CMN No. 3.912, de 7 de outubro de 2010, art. 1, D.O.U. de 8.10.10 (Braz.), available at
https://www3.bcb.gov.br/normativo/detalharNormativo.do?method=detalharNormativo&N=1 10086413.
51. Circular No. 3.507, de 6 de outubro de 2010, teta 1, capitulo 3, seqgo 5, 5(a), D.O.U. de 7.10.10 (Braz.),
available at https://www3.bcb.gov.br/normativo/detalharNormativo.do?method-detalharNormativo&N.110
086742.
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